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Constitutionality of Non-Contentious Cases in Japan
Thomas Makoto Naruseͤ
Abstract
In the United States, there was a debate on vesting Article 3 Court extrajudicial authorities,
and United States Supreme Court have often denied vesting such authority. In contrast, in Japan,
extrajudicial authorities (including those without element of dispute) are vested in courts since the
age of Meiji Constitution, and only recently, questions are posed. Today, many scholars are
struggling with this issue, and some approaches are shown: one is to conceive the limit of authority
which courts can handle according to the distance from properly judicial power, which has dispute
as the core element, and the other is to change the definition of the judicial power, and conceive
that dispute is not an requisite element of judicial power. However, there arise doubts on both of
the approaches. This article introduces the debate concerning the limit of judicial power and noncontentious cases with references to the history, and then present a direction toward a new
approach. Instead of discussing the topic in specific details, this articles introduces a brief overview
of the topic.

Key Words: Judicial Power, Extrajuducial Authorities, Dispute, Separation of Powers,
Constitution of Japan

1. Forward
Recently, there have been discussions about non-contentious cases in the United States; for
example, the debate between Professor Pfander and Professor Woolhandler1. In the debate, it have
been discussed that how to place non-contentious cases -an extrajudicial, non-adverse proceedingsunder Constitution2. On the other hand, in Japan, however non-contentious cases are conceived as
extrajudicial authority, it is widely accepted and actively used. Non-contentious cases are divided
into two categories, one where there has been a certain amount of adversity, and one lacking
adversity. Unlike the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Japan does not
stipulate the subject of jurisdiction in the express statement3. However, it has been conceptualized
in a way that is somewhat similar to that of the United States. Moreover, unlike in the United
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James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and NonContentious Jurisdiction, 124 Yale L. J. (2015)., James E. Pfander & Emily K. Damrau, A Non-Contentious
Account of Article III’d Domestic Relations Exception, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 117(2016)., James E. Pfander &
Daniel Birk, Adverse Interests and Article III: A Reply, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1067 (2017), Ann Woolhandler,
Adverse Interests and Article III, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1025 (2017),
2 See generally, articles listed in footnote 1.
3 Nihonkoku Kenpo[Constitution][Kenpo] art. 76, section 1 (Japan).
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States, it has not been questioned for many years about the constitutionality of vesting the courts
authorities which are not within the judicial power by the legislature.
In recent years, doubts about giving the courts extrajudicial authority have been presented, and
alternative theories have been discussed. As a fundamental stance of the doctrine, scholars try to
justify the extrajudicial authorities of the courts. There, they try to justify authorization “from a
distance” by the proper judicial power, in accordance with how close it is to the proper judicial
power. However, as pointed out in my previous works, it is difficult to grasp non-contentious cases
from such a viewpoint.
The purpose of this article is to introduce theories of non-contentious cases in Japan, by
introducing a brief overview of the topic. Firstly, the article describes how judicial power was
conceived in Japan. Then, describes the characteristics of non-contentious cases involving
procedures introduced under the Meiji Constitution. Based on that, the article will draw out how
non-contentious cases were defined under the Meiji Constitution, and how this was considered
during the process of drafting the current Constitution. Finally, the article will present some doubts
after touching upon the two views presented in recent articles on non-contentious cases.
The aim of this article was to introduce Japanese scholarly works in English There, please note
that there are some overlapping in the contents with my previous works4.
2. Conventional Views of Judicial Power, and Criticisms Made Against Them
(1) Conventional Views of Judicial Power
Judicial power is articulated in Article 76, section 1 of the Constitution of Japan as “The whole
judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law.5”
No provision provides definition of judicial power in the Constitution. However, Professor Kiyomiya
defined it as “the functions of the state that apply and declare the law to concrete dispute, and
decide that6.” Although there are expressional differences, this definition is widely shared between
academics and in practice.
What is noteworthy here is that despite the absence of provisions limiting the subject of
jurisdiction seen in Article 3, Section 2, of the United States Constitution, the subject of judicial
power is conceived to be limited to “concrete disputes.” Here, the meaning of “concrete disputes”
becomes a problem. Regarding this point, a reference is made to Article 3, section 1 of the Court
Act, which is the law that embodies Article 76 of the Constitution. The same article defines the
authority of the courts, as “Courts shall, except as specifically provided for in the Constitution of
Japan, decide all legal disputes, and have such other powers as are specifically provided for by
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law7.” Here, “legal dispute” is conceived to be synonymous with “concrete dispute.” However, its
content is not detailed in the text. In this regard, the precedents of the Supreme Court indicate
views. A legal dispute is “a controversy concerning concrete rights or duties, or the existence of
legal relations, between parties8” and “to be resolved with finality by the application of the law9.”
These requirements are also widely accepted in both academia and practice.
As mentioned above, a discussion of the range of judicial power in Japan has a complex
appearance. When organized, the figure “judicial power in Article 76 of the Constitution = concrete
dispute = Legal dispute under Article 3 of the Court Act = requirement presented by the supreme
court10” is drawn. In such a discussion, it can be noted that the “self-understanding” of judicial
power is purported to pursue a “private right model”11. Professor Shishido’s analysis suggests that
the court has fallen into excessive self-restraint, according to the view that the court finds its
mission or essence in a non - authoritative civil suit12.
However, the authority of the court is not limited to the exercise of judicial power as above.
Article 3, paragraph 1 of the above-mentioned Court Act defines that courts “have such other
powers as are specifically provided for by law,13” and the purpose of the article is to allow the
exercise of powers other than “legal disputes,” that is the exercise of judicial power. In other words,
the Court Act enables the vesting of extrajudicial authorities in the courts. The first thing to
mention

about

this

point

is

the

administration of

judicial

affairs,

and

the

rule-

making power of the Supreme Court, stipulated by Article 77 of the Constitution. Since those
powers are granted by the Constitution, those powers should not become a problem. The problem
is the authority of a judicial decision that are considered as extrajudicial power, such as, “objective
litigation㸦Kyakkan Sosho㸧” and the “non-contentious case.” First of all, objective litigation is
litigation that aims to guarantee objective legal appropriateness of laws or protect the interests of
the general public14. It is distinct from “subjective litigation㸦Shukan Sosho㸧, ” authorities which
are within judicial power, and the aim is to protect individual legal rights15. The difference is that
proving the infringement of rights is not required in a subjective litigation, because the purpose is
to ensure the legality of government actions, not the protection of personal rights. In addition,
subjective litigation is the exercise of authority vested in the courts as an extrajudicial authority.
Japan's dominant view defines administrative power as the power of the state excluding both
legislative and judicial power16. Objective litigation and non-contentious cases do not fall within

㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌
7

Saibanshoho[Courts Act][Saibanshoho]art.3, section 1㸦Japan㸧.
Vol.4 No.11, Saiko Saibansho Gyosei Jiken Saiban Reishu, 2761(Sup. Ct., Nov. 17, 1953).
9 Id.
10 Minamino Shigeru, Shihoken no Gainen [ The Concept of Judicial Power], in Yasunishi Fumio et al.
Kenpogaku no Gendaiteki Ronten 2nd ed. 178 (Yuhikaku 2009).
11 Shishido Joji, Shiho no Pragmatic [Pragmatic of Judiciary], 322 Hogaku Kyoshitsu 26 (2007).
12 Id.
13 Saibanshoho art.3, section 1.
14 Shiono Hiroshi, Gyoseiho II Gyosei Kyusaiho Daigohan [Administrative Law II Administrative Remedy
Law 5th ed.] 81 (Yuhikaku 2011).
15 Id.
16 Ashibe Nobuyoshi, Kenpo Dairoppan [Constitution 6th ed.] 322-23 (Iwanami Shoten 2015).
8
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the remit of judicial power nor legislative power. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that such cases
fall with the remit of administrative power.
In the United States, there was a debate on vesting Article 3 Courts with extrajudicial authority,
and the United States Supreme Court has often denied vesting such authority. However, such a
discussion has not been had for a long time in Japan. Like in the United States, in Japan, the
separation of powers is interpreted as a constitutional principle. It has been pointed out that the
conventional majority view is that the separation of powers should be applied strictly17. On the
other hand, however, extrajudicial authority has been vested in courts, which involves the exercise
of administrative power, and such a “contradiction” has been overlooked.
(2) Criticisms Against the Majority Theory
Criticisms have arisen in response to the majority view mentioned above. Professor Nosaka has
pointed out that the majority view does not demonstrate the grounds for vesting extrajudicial
authority in the court, and hardly seems to be aware of the problem18. Professor Minamino and
Professor Takahashi also identified this problem19. In other words, in the conventional majority
view, change in the distribution of authority are done by statute, despite the authorities are
distributed by Constitution, and it is questionable whether such action is unconstitutional20. This
criticism is based on a strict view of the separation of powers. In other words, under the
Constitution, the principle of the separation of powers is defined, whereby power is divided and
granted to different divisions. This distribution is a constitutional principle. Moreover, so-called
objective litigation and non-contentious cases are considered to involve the exercise of authority
outside of judicial power, which is not included in legislative power, so according to the majority
view, it must fall within the remit of administrative power. However, the Constitution vests
administrative power in the Cabinet. Thus, explanation and justification is needed for such changes
by statute, and also, a line needs to be drawn to indicate to what extent it is possible. Claiming that
objective litigation is unconstitutional is “too reckless21.” Professor Shishido summarized the views
of three representative constitutional law scholars, and all three of them argued the objective
litigation (citizen’s actions, interagency actions, and election suits) - which are an important means
of legal control- constitutional, while drawing lines that make abstract judicial review
unconstitutional22. Moreover, most other scholars of constitutional law have shared this stance.
They took the approach that a limit must be drawn that defines when one can imitate a dispute23,
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17 Muranishi Ryota, Kenryoku Bunritsuron no Gendaiteki Tenkai -Kinouteki Kenryoku Bunritsuron no
Kanousei-[Modern Deployment of Separation of Powers-The Possibility of Functional Approach to
Separation of Powers-], 90 Kyudai Hogaku 214, 231 (2015).
18 Nosaka Yasuji, Kenpo to Shihoken -Kenpojo no Shihoken no Toraekata wo Megutte [Constitution and
Judicial Power], 246 Hogaku Kyoshitu 43 (2001).
19 Takahashi Kazuyuki, Taikei Kenpo Sosho [Theory of Constitutional Litigation] 33-34 ( Iwanami Shoten
2017) [hereinafter Litigation]. Minamino, supra note 10, at 177.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Shishido, supra note 11, at 26.
23 See generally, Sato Koji, Nihonkoku Kenporon [Theory of Japanese Constitution] (Seibundo 2011).
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or enlarge the requirement of a “case.”24 Still, both of those approaches share the construction of
drawing a line with reference to the distance from the “proper judicial power”, which is the “judicial
power” defined in the Constitution.

In other words, the concept of judicial power, and more

specifically the concept of “dispute,” has been the merkmal.
Non-contentious cases are the authorities very “far” from the “proper judicial power” defined in
the Constitution. Non-contentious cases also existed under the Meiji Constitution and had been
handed down under the current Constitution. In the following section, the article will see how noncontentious cases were conceived under the Meiji Constitution and during the process of drafting
the current Constitution and the Court Act, to show how judicial power has been conceived and
how the provision of extrajudicial authority has been justified.
3. Non-Contentious Cases, and Their Historical Background
(1) Overview
Non-contentious cases are defined as judicial proceedings that involve the processing of civil
cases that are not litigation proceedings25. There are various kinds of non-contentious cases, and
their degree of dispute varies. Among them, this article deals with non-disputational authorities.
As a specific example, there is a procedure for changing one’s name. To change one’s name for
legitimate reasons, permission from the family court is required. The petitioner is the person who
wishes to change their name, who submits the petition and attached documents (usually “certificate
of family register” and evidence proving the reason for the change). After being granted the
permission of the court, the person then registers the change at a municipal office.
What is noteworthy here is that there are no parties to counter the proceedings; therefore, a
“dispute” is not involved. The court examines the submitted documents or interviews and judges
whether there are legitimate reasons for the change of name. It is very different both procedurally
and practically from litigation process. Here, it should be noted that (1) non-disputional noncontentious case does not involve conflict resolution, and (2) the court plays a guardianship or
supervisory function and carries out an administrative function in terms of its substantive
meaning26.
This involves a wholly different type of process from the exercise of judicial power defined as “the
functions of the state that apply and declare the law to concrete disputes, and decide that27.” In the
first place, a “dispute” does not exist, and there are no adverse parties. Therefore, the question arises
about how such authority is positioned. History reveals that the concept of the non-contentious case
was adopted under the Meiji Constitution, and continued during the process of drafting the present
Constitution and the Court Act, up to the present day. By tracing its history below, this article shows
(1) how the non-contentious case has been characterized historically, (2) how such extrajudicial
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24 Nosaka, supra note 18. Nakagawa Takehisa, Gyoseijiken Sosho no Kaisei- Sono Zentei to naru
Kouhouteki Eii- [Amendment of Administlative Case Litigation Act] 63 Koho Kenkyu 127 (2001).
25 Ito Susumu& Mitsui Tetsuo eds., Chukai Hisho Jiken Tetsudukiho [Commentary Non-Contentious Case
Procedures Act] 3 (Seirin Shoten 1986).
26 Shibutani Hideki, Sosho to Hisho [Litigation and Non-contentious Cases], 5 Rikkyo Homu Kenkyujo 5
(2012).
27 Kiyomiya, supra note 6, at 330.
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authority was conceived when it was incorporated into the present constitutional system, and (3) how
a conflict with the separation of powers has been understood. There, this article look at the origins of
non-contentious cases in the process of drafting the Constitution of Japan and the Court Act, after
outlining how they were conceived under the Meiji Constitution.
(2) Position of Non-Contentious Cases Theoretically Under the Meiji Constitution
Although the history of non-contentious cases dates back to ancient times28, the former NonContentious Case Procedures Act㸦Hishojiken Sosho Hou㸧was enacted in Japan following the
promulgation of the former Civil Code (Minpo) and the former Commercial Code (Shoho) in 188829.
Below I would like to outline the status of non-contentious cases by reviewing their conception
under the Meiji Constitution.
Professor Uesugi defines judicial power as the authority that adjudicates the litigation of civil
and criminal cases; and the non-contentious case does not involve litigation30. Then he argues that
Article 57 of the Meiji Constitution prohibits judicial power from being assigned to other divisions,
yet it is not a constitutional violation to refer a non-contentious case to the court31.
Professor Shimizu pointed out that as the Constitution vests judicial power in the courts;
therefore, it is a constitutional violation to have any part of the jurisdiction of the civil and criminal
litigation procedure decided by administrative divisions32. In this way, it is impossible to reduce
the range of judicial power by statute, but it does not prevent vesting the courts with “special
authority,” that is not properly “judiciary.” 33 As examples, non-contentious cases such as
registration affairs, and election lawsuits are listed, and this view is similar to those that vest
courts with authority in non-contentious cases and “objective litigation” by statute seen today34. In
addition, it will be noticed here that any “special authority” refers to extrajudicial authority.
Professor Minobe defines judicial power both in a broad sense and in a narrow sense. When
comparing it with legislative and administrative power, judicial power in a broad sense is regarded
as all government functions in civil and criminal matters under the law35. On the other hand,
judicial power in the narrow sense applies to civil and criminal litigation36. Here, “civil function.”
refers to the function of the state in private law relations in order to preserve private law orders37.
The objective is to make laws between individuals and to protect and maintain existing laws
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See generally, Ito & Mitsui supra note 22, at 15.
Id., at 68.
30 Uesugi Shinkichi, Kenpo Jutsugi Zouho Kaitei Yonhan [Lecture on Constitutional Law 4th ed.] 577-78
(Yuhikaku 1925).
31 Id., at 578-79.
32 Shimizu Toru, Chikujo Teikokukenpo Kogi [Clause by Clause Lecture on ConstitutionalLaw] 431
(Shokado Shoten 1933).
33 Id.
34 Id., at 431-32.
35 Minobe Tatsukichi, Kenpo Teiyo Kaitei Daigohan [Summary Lecture on Constitutional Law 5th ed.] 46465 (Yuhikaku 1935).
36 Id.
37 Id., at 465.
29
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between individuals38. Here, it is noteworthy that law refers to “means” in other divisions, whereas
the protection and maintenance of the law is the main “objective” of the courts39.
From a practical point of view, such civil functions can be divided into a “creative function” and
“protective function.”40 The former involves the maintenance of civil legal order; and the state is
involved in the formation of private law relations, such as bankruptcy declarations and
disappearance declarations41. The latter function ensures the effectiveness of existing legislation,
with confirmation, negotiation, and compulsory enforcement listed as the most important42.
From a practical point of view, the civil function is classified as described above, but from the
procedural standpoint, it can be divided into civil lawsuits and non-contentious cases43. In contrast
to civil lawsuits that involve civil functions through litigation processes conducted by proceedings,
non-contentious cases do not have a civil function involving litigation processes; rather, the state
function involves private legal relations under laws and regulations, not procedures of “dispute”44.
In addition, the litigation process here refers to procedures involving adverse parties who are
arguing about legal relations, while the state hears the arguments of both sides to make a judgment
as a third party45.
Professor Minobe's viewpoint divides judicial power into a broad sense and a narrow sense, and
in the broad sense, judicial power is conceived of very widely. However, in line with the interests of
this article, “dispute” concerns the exercise of judicial power in a narrow sense, and non-contentious
cases are not included. Professor Minobe's opinion conceives of judicial power broadly at first sight,
which is consistent with other views, in that it separates non-contentious cases and litigation
processes according to “dispute.”
As mentioned above, under the Meiji Constitution, non-contentious case were regarded as
beyond the remit of “litigation” or judicial power. It was understood that non-contentious cases are
administrative functions that was vested in the court. Then, how did such an understanding was
changed during the process of drafting the current Constitution? To answer this question, I shall
turn to the process of drafting current Constitution and the Court Act.
(3) The Nature of the Non-Contentious Case in the Process of Drafting the Constitution of Japan
and the Court Act46
During the process of drafting the Constitution of Japan, the main issue concerning the clauses
on judicial power was the transition of the jurisdiction of administrative case litigation to the
judicial court, but the incidental reference was made to the range of judicial power47. In response
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Id.
Id.
40 Id., at 466.
41 Id., at 466-67.
42 Id.
43 Id., at 467.
44 Id., at 467-68.
45 Id., at 467.
46 The contents of this section is re-construction of a part of my previous work. Non-Contentious Cases,
supra note 4, at 205-06, and see generally, Injury, supra note 4.
47 Injury, supra note 4, 329-44.
39
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to a question, for example, in the deliberations of the Privy Council, Professor Minobe, who was
also a member of the council, asked whether judicial power had the same meaning as jurisdiction,
and minister Matsumoto responded that litigation involving the rights and obligations of citizens
are within the remit of judicial power48. In the anticipated questions and answers prepared by the
government prior to deliberation at the 90th Imperial Diet, a question about why we do not have
an Austrian-style Constitutional Court was answered. Under the separation of powers, it is a
natural thing to refuse to apply unconstitutional laws, according to “the nature of the judicial duties
which adopts laws to pass judgment to the actual controversy concerning legal relations”49. Here,
actual “dispute” is connected to the “nature” of judicial power50. In addition, during the committee
of the House of Peers, one of the members insisted on the possibility of an abstract judicial review,
but Minister Kanamori said that the court deals with the litigation of concrete cases only, therefore
the Constitution requires concrete

judicial review51. Although it was mentioned indirectly in this

way, it was stated that judicial power is invoked when a “case” occurs, and deals with matters
concerning the rights and duties of individuals. This view is similar to today’s view52. It should also
be pointed out that the concept of litigation was centered on the resolution of a “dispute” from here.
The major difference between the former and current Constitution involves the transition of
authorities responsible for administrative cases, the creation of judicial review system, and review
by the people53. However, judicial power is still invoked in cases concerning the rights and duties
of individuals, in continuity with the former Constitution 54 . It is notable that, in 1949, the
Constitution did not define the scope and meaning of judicial power clearly, and it seems to follow
the concept as understood under the era of the Meiji Constitution 55 . Such continuity is also
apparent in the continuity of the Court Act and the Court Constitution Act (Saibansho Kousei Hou)
- a statute under the Meiji Constitution56.
The process of drafting the Constitution of Japan continued to define judicial power as a private
right model, which involves a dispute resolution process and presupposes the existence of a case
concerning legal rights and duties of individuals. Regarding non-contentious cases, the Minister of
Justice Kimura said that it would be possible to vest the courts with the authority to process the
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Irie Toshiro, Kenpo Seiritsu no Keii to Kenpojo no Shomondai Irie Toshiro Ronbunshu [Drafting Process of
Japanese Constitution and Issues on Constitution] 331 (Yuhikaku 1976).
49 Sato Tatsuo, Nihonkou Kenpo Seiritsushi dai 3 kan [3 History of drafting process of Japanese
Constitution] 479 (Sato Isao ed., Yuhikaku 1994).
50 Id.
51 Stenographic Record of Special Committee on Amendment of Imperial Constitution, House of Peers, 90th
Imperial Diet, No.20, at 19-20.
52 See generally, Injury, supra note 4.
53 Shimizu Shin, Chikujo Nihonkoku Kenpo Shingiroku dai 3 kan [3 Clause by Clause Record of
Deliberations on Japanese Constitution in Imperial Diet] 447-48 (Yuhikaku 1962).
54 Injury, supra note 4, 338-40.
55 Suzuki Takeo et al. eds., Chukai Nihonkoku Kenpo Chukan [2 Commentary on Japanese Constitution]
307 (Yuhikaku 1949). Id., at 301-02. It is also noteworthy that definition of judicial power appeared in
professor Kiyomiya’s work under Meiji constitution has similarities between his definition widely shared
today. Kiyomiya Shiro, Kokkasayo no Riron [Theory of State Function] 23 (Yuhikaku 1968).
56 Naito Yorihiro, Shusengo no Shihoseido Kaikaku no Keika dai2 Bunsatsu [2 The Process of Reformation
of Judicial System after World War II] 406 (Shiho Kenshujo 1959).
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family register, registration, mediation, and so on 57 . He said that the details were under
consideration58, and the Court Act took on that “detail.”
In the Court Act enactment process, the same view presented during the drafting the
Constitution was discussed59. The second draft suggests that non-contentious cases are not within
the remit of judicial power, and that the existence of “dispute” is referred to as merkmal 60 .
Meanwhile, the third drafting explained that the meaning of “dispute” involves the assertion of the
right to oppose an adverse party, and seek confirmation of their existence or non-existence61. From
here too, the resolution of a “dispute” is the key activity of judicial power.
However, later there was a discussion in the Privy Council62. That is, at that point, the bill
defined the court's authority extend to “legal disputes,” however, if the court could handle authority
such as a non-contentious case, it was claimed that vesting such extrajudicial authority should be
defined in an article63. Initially, the government admitted that non-contentious cases were not
“disputes”64, and the government insisted that it presupposed from the beginning the vesting of
extrajudicial authority by statute, just like the system under the Meiji Constitution65. However,
after being criticized, the government changed this attitude and included an explicit provision that
enabled the vesting of extrajudicial authority in the courts by statute, which became the
composition of the text as it is now.
(4) Summary
As we have seen above, in theory, non-contentious cases were also regarded as within the remit
of extrajudicial authority under the Meiji Constitution. Some viewed such an authority as
possessing an administrative function. During the drafting of the current Constitution and Court
Act, “dispute” became a key concept defining the remit of judicial power. Non-contentious cases fell
within the remit of a separate authority from litigation and judicial power.
However, as is clear from the discussion of the Court Act drafting process, the grounds for
providing the court with extrajudicial power were not discussed. The government saw it as obvious.
The objections were also only asking for clarification of the statute; however, no questions arose
about the constitutionality of vesting such authority in the courts, despite the principle of
separation of powers.
The issue concerning the separation of powers as seen in recent years has not been recognized.
Non-contentious cases have rested in courts under the premise of a moderate view of separation of
powers, and as Professor Nosaka pointed out, even during the process of drafting the Court Act,
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the problems surrounding the constitutionality of granting such authority were not acknowledged
consciously66. However, in recent years, two views have been presented of non-contentious cases;
those of Professor Kimiduka and Professor Takahashi. Below, This article shall review those views,
and then presents some questions.
4. Current Theories of the Constitutional Status of Non-Contentious Cases
In discussions over the limits of the jurisdiction of courts, so-called “objective litigation” has
been the main issue. The non-contentious case was mostly concomitantly referred. However, in
recent years, two theories have dealt directly with the relationship between non-contentious case
and judicial power. Below, each view is discussed.
(1) View of Professor Kimiduka67
Professor Kimiduka’s view tries to capture the non-contentious case in terms of its distance from
the proper judicial power. He contends that the extrajudicial power which could be vested on the
courts must involve a “dispute,” and it must also involve “an appeal from one of the parties, the
court, as a neutral department, takes part in the remedy, which comprises the realization of
substantive legal rights with the function of declaration and maintenance of law, and which is
suitable for processing by the courts68.” Regarding the limits of authority that could be vested on
the court, it is difficult to ease the requirement of the “concrete case,” legal judgment, and finality
in some sense69. Therefore, the line should be drawn where it can be achieved by relaxing the
requirement of standing and the “interests of the complainants㸦uttae no rieki㸧.”70 As seen above,
his theory is based on the concept of “dispute resolution.”
However, for non-contentious cases, he finds some sort of “dispute” there. There he contends
that non-contentious case is a proceeding where the court, by an appeal of a party, applies the law,
and confirm rights and duties with finality71. Then he refers to the views of Professor Kiyomiya
and Professor Koji Sato, and points out the similarities between judicial power and the noncontentious case72.
In this way, Professor Kimiduka develops his theory based on the view that “dispute” remains
the key concept. However, can the name change procedure mentioned earlier be included?
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Difficulties will arise by expanding the concept of “dispute” to include ex-parte proceedings, which
do not have the characteristics of a “dispute.”
(2) View of Professor Takahashi73
On the other hand, Professor Takahashi adopts a different approach. Professor Takahashi
states that separation of powers is to be distributed by “legal nature” rather than “distribution of
matter;” 74 and conceived the authority of each division as legislative power as primitive law
making, administrative power as law enforcement, and judicial power as the final ruling of the
interpretation and application of the law 75 . In this way, the roles of each department are
determined not by “matter” but by “legal nature,” so flexibility is provided.
He has long defined judicial power as “the function, with legitimate appeal, under appropriate
procedures, judge with finality on the controversy about interpretation and application of laws76.”
However, he said that it is difficult to imitate a “dispute” in name changing proceedings, which is
an example of a non-contentious case77. Accordingly, “dispute” is removed from the definition of
judicial power and it is corrected to the form “the function, with legitimate appeal, under
appropriate procedures, confirm the interpretation and application of law with finality, and give
effective remedy78”79.
In the opinion of Professor Takahashi, where he points that in some areas it is difficult to find
any “dispute” in non-contentious case proceedings, is also consistent with the stance of this article.
It is noteworthy that he banished the concept of “dispute” from the definition of judicial power.
Professor Kimiduka and the traditional view finds the concept of “dispute” a requisite element of
authority, which can be vested in courts. Then they tried to include a “non-dispute” authority in
that definition there. On the other hand, Professor Takahashi has tried to justify non-contentious
cases by removing “dispute” from the definition of judicial power. It is an interesting approach and
one way that remains open if a non-contentious case cannot be included in a “dispute.”
(3) Some Questions to Those Views80
The views above present interesting perspectives from different individuals. First, Professor
Kimiduka's view shares a basic proposition with the conventional view and is trying to grasp the
authority given to the court based upon a “dispute.” It is noteworthy that requirements of a “case”
are stipulated although they are loosened. However, it is impossible to incorporate a “non-dispute”
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supra note 4, at 207-08.
74 Litigation, supra note 19, at 46.
75 Id.
76 Takahashi Kazuyuki, Shiho no Kannen [Concept of Judicial Power], in Koza Kenpogaku 6 Kenryoku no
Bunritsu 2, 23-24 (Higuchi Yoichi ed., Nihon Hyoronsha 1995).
77 Litigation, supra note 19, at 49.
78 Id.
79 Id., at 48-49.
80 The contents of this section is re-construction of a part of my previous work. Non-Contentious Cases,
supra note 4, at 207-08.
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into a “dispute” category81. If we include authorities such as name changing procedures in a “dispute,”
we must enlarge the concept. On the other hand, Professor Takahashi refuses to include “non-dispute”
in “dispute.” Therefore, he eliminates “dispute” from the definition of judicial power. However, then
it is very hard to avoid the criticism that involves too much expansion of judicial power82.
As above, questions are presented to both approaches, the expansion of the concept of “dispute”
and the expansion of “judicial power” itself. However, both of them; enlarge the meaning of dispute
or the expansion of judicial power; have problems. At the same time, as evidenced by the fact that
non-contentious cases were also seen under the Meiji Constitution, the court has historically been
vested with a power not related to “dispute.” The history seems to show that such an authority is
suitable for courts. Unless judging non-contentious cases unconstitutional, we have to conceive
those authorities as non-dispute, extrajudicial, and constitutional.
According to previous approaches, there were two methods for processing non-contentious cases:
by imitating a dispute or expanding the remit of judicial power. However, there is another way;
change the basis of justification according to the nature of the authorities83. Professor Kimiduka’s
approach was to vest to the court with the authority, which has the function of dispute resolution.
Since “objective litigation” is a kind of litigation which has a certain degree of “dispute,” the limit
can be defined by referring to the distance from a “dispute.” However, as non-contentious cases do
not involve a dispute resolution process, there should be another measure. Rather than using a
single criterion of “dispute”, it may be necessary to separate criteria according to their functions84.
5. Conclusion
Unlike the United States, vesting extrajudicial authorities in the courts had been accepted
without doubts in Japan. This is deeply rooted in constitutional history, although it has logical
inconsistencies. Under the current Constitution, and not so far past, questions have arisen.
Academics developed theories and tried to answer the question by drawing a line in terms of
the distance from the proper judicial power, or by eliminating the element of dispute from the
definition of judicial power. However, both of them seem to go too far: too broad a definition of
“dispute,” or too large an expansion of “judicial power.” Therefore, this article proposes another
approach: rather than using a single criterion, separate criteria should be applied according to the
functions provided. “Dispute” will work well with objective litigation because such a case has a
dispute resolution function. However, it will not work well with non-contentious cases. If we do not
want to expand the remit of judicial power, a suitable method for explaining and processing noncontentious cases must be identified.
To create separate criteria, a further investigation of the separation of powers is needed. In
addition, the separation of powers will need to be investigated in functional way, which adheres to
the traditional Japanese view of the separation of powers. However, a specific discussion goes
beyond the scope of this article, but will be revisited in a future article.
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